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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO
PETITION FOR RDBNli.O

U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING
co., a corporation, and WYOMING
MINERAL CORPORATION, a
corporation,

Case No. 16209

Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff/Appellant Allen-Howe Specialties Corp.'s ("Appellant•)
Petition for Rehearing is improper because 1) the

ar~ta

are

improperly raised at this late date; 2) the arguments were not
overlooked in this court's Opinion of April 21, 1980; and, 3)
Appellant's arguments fail on their merits.

Each of these points

will be treated below.

Appellant's Facts are essentially correct, except in its
failure to note that the arguments now made by Appellant were
raised for the first time in its Reply Brief on appeal.

Further,

Appellant too narrowly construes this Court's Opinion of April 21,
1980

as relying only on the five day notice provision, instead of

both non-compliance with the five day notice provision and the
presence of a no damage for delay clause.
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I.

ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Tbe Appellant bas lost its opportunity to have these issues
coa.idered by this Court.

The Appellant originally filed this

Action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake county,
State of Utah, on December 15, 1977.

In connection with its clau

for additional compensation, Appellant alleged in its Count II as
followe:
14. Pursuant to its contract with u.s.
Construction, Inc., together with extras,
plaintiff performed labor and furnished
materials in the amount of $128,302.42 of
which amount u.s. Construction, Inc. has
paid $53,292.00, leaving a balance due of
$75,010.42. (R4)

Aa is apparent from its Petition for Rehearing, Appellant now
seeks compensation not for "extras", as alleged in its Complaint,
but rather for interference.

In addition, at no point in its

original complaint did Appellant allege that any provision of
the contract had been waived by U.S. Construction or any agent
of U.S. Construction.
The Defendants moved for a Summary Judgment in the Fall of
1978.

At that time, Defendants fully set forth their argument

concerning Plaintiff being barred from any relief by contract
provisions. (R.102- 104).

In its Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellant did not, in
any form, raise the arguments it now raises in its Petition for
Rehearing.

(See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Mot1on

for Summary Judgment, R.l46 - 165).
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Neither did Appellant raise these issues in its •arief of
Appellant" filed with this Court on appeal.
The arguments were first raised by the Appellants in its
Reply Brief, at a time when Defendants had neither an opportunity to object to the issues being suddenly raised, nor an
opportunity to respond to those arguments.
Since this waiver argument was neither pled nor argued at
the trial level below, the Supreme Court need not now consider
the argument.

As this Court held in wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d

366, 482 P.2d 704, 705 (1971):

Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor
put in issue at the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
In Simpson v. General Motors
this court held that a party
a new doctrine upon which to
liability for the first time
This court stated:

Corporation
may not inject
predicate
on appeal.

. . . Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose
is the final settlement of controversies,
requires that a party must present his
entire case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done
so, he cannot thereafter change to some
different theory and thus attempt to keep in
motion a merry-go-round of litigation.
Appellants improperly raised these arguments for the first
time in its Reply Brief.

Appellants now seek to obtain a

rehearing based on issues which were not properly before this
Court on appeal.

on that basis alone, the Petition for Rehearing

should be rejected.

The Appellant is not entitled to raise new

1ssues at each successive stage of litigation.
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II.

T.BB APRIL 21, 1980 OPINION OVERLOOKS NO ISSUE.
In it8 Petition for Rehearing the Appellant incorrectly
contenda that this Court overlooked its "waiver" argument concerninq the five day notice provision.
~·

The Appellant is wronq.

Court's Opinion of April 21, 1980 specifically held that:
All of the invoices submitted by plaintiff
to u.s.c. were beyond the five-day limitation
period set forth in the foregoing provision; so
any claim of u.s.c. against the owner for alleged
interference would be deemed waived. Furthermore,
plaintiff attributed some of the problems of
interference on the congested building site to
initial delays in the project caused by rain.
The contract between
omin and u.s.c. s eci1Ca ~ prec udes any cla1m for add1t1onal compensat1on or damages by reason of any delay.
since there is no basis for u.s.c. to claim
damages or additional compensation from Wyoming
on the claims asserted by plaintiff, plaintiff is
not entitled under the provisions of Section 6 of
its contract to an increase in the subcontract
price, or damages for delay, or interference
caused by the acts of the owner, contractor or
other subcontractors. (Page 4, Slip Opinion)
(Emphasis supplied).
Inherent in the above holding is a rejection of the

Appell~t

arguments. The Court was entitled to conclude in its April 21,
1980 Opinion that neither the record nor the law supports the

Appellant's arguments.

This Court is not bound to address each

and every minor argument raised in the Briefs of the parties.
Rather, a holding such as the Court issued in this case encompasses an implicit rejection of the arguments now raised.
In any event, the Court's holding has two bases.

First,

claims for interference must be submitted within five days of tl.t
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occurrence; and, second, Appellant is entitled to no daaagea
caused by the delay relating to the interference.

That boldiDg

bars Appellant's present arguments.
III.

APPELLANT' S ARGUMENTS FAIL ON THEIR MERITS
Appellant's argument is broken into two parta: Firat, tbat
the allowance of compensation for damages caused Appellant bJ a
collision between its crane and a Jacob's Engineering crane
waived the five day notice provision; and, second, that an offer
for a novation of the contract from Appellant dated August 8, 1977
was somehow compliance with the five day notice provision for tbe
remaining performance under the contract.
The latter argument is nonsensical.

The August 8, 1977

document is entitled "Proposal" and is coached in terms of a
complete renegotiation of the contract between
and Appellant.

(R. 237, D-12).

u.s. Construction

Further, it is entitled "Request

for Extra Work Authorization and Extension of Time."

Id.

Appellant

now contends, however, that it seeks compensation for interference,
not for extra work.

In fact, if the request was for extra work,

it was specifically rejected, as is indicated on R. 237, D-12, and
is therefore of no assistance to Appellant.
Finally, paragraph 9 of the contract between Wyoming Minerals
and u.s. Construction, which this Court has held governs the
Appellant, provides that
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• . . Any claim of the Contractor arising out
of any alleged interference due to the conduct
of such other work shall be made to the Owner
in writing within five (5) days of the occurrence of the alleged interference and shall
be deemed to have been waived unless so made.
Clearly, paragraph 9 of that contract requires submission of a
request

~

the interference.

Appellant urges this court to

allow it to redraft that provision to allow submission of one
request for all hypothetical, prospective interference.

Appel-

lant's argument is that this Court should reject and redraft
unambiguous contract language.

That argument was rejected by

this Court in its April 21, 1980 Opinion.
Appellant devotes greater attention to its waiver argument.
Appellant argues that the grant of compensation (R. 237, D-27)
for an alleged occurrence of interference in July constituted a
waiver of the five day notice provision.

That compensation was

not approved until the latter part of September, 1977.
D-27).

(R. 237,

From that document, and a preceding meeting, Appellant

argues that there has been a retroactive waiver of the five day
notice provision for all prior invoices relating to interference.
Appellant's argument must be rejected.
As correctly stated in Appellant's Petition for Rehearing,
a waiver requires, "an existing right, benefit or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it."
Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Utah 1978).

The right

here in question was that u.s. Construction need only consider
claims for interference subrnltted wlthin flve days of the occurrene~.

As is clear from the record, u.S. Constructlon unl forml;
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exercised that right throughout Appellant's perforaance.l

Tbe

only deviation took place when one claim was granted, after all
others were rejected.

Neither Sandberg nor the other caaea cited

by Appellant, Vitra-Spray of Florida v. Gumenick, 144 so. 24 533
(Fla. App 1962) and Rivercliff Co. v. Linebarger, 233 Ark. 105,
264

s.w.

2d 842, cert. den., 348

a retroactive waiver.

u.s.

834 (1954) stand for aucb

Appellant's own behavior, in

a~tting

claims for interference in the same format throughout ita performance, illustrates that it did not believe that any ...ting,
or grant of a particular claim, waived any right of U.S. Construction.
u.s. Construction uniformly enforced its right to reject untimely
claims before and after the August 22, 1977 meeting. (See footnote
1).

No "intentional relinquishment of a known right" can be

1nferred from u.s. construction's actions.
Broad public policy reasons mitigate against implying any
across the board waiver because of the August 22, 1977 meeting or
approval of the crane claim.

This Court would seriously impede

settlement of disputed matters if, in doing so, a person risks
compromising prior claim rejections.

In a similar case, the

court in sam Finley, Inc. v. Pilcher, Livingston and Wallace, Inc.,
314 F. Supp. 654, 655 (S.D. Ga. 1970), a Miller Act suit by a

1Requests for compensation for interference, in the form of
invoices, and dated as follows, were rejected by U.S. Construct1on:
June 29, 1977 (R. 237, D-9); July 28, 1977 (R. 237, D-10); August 8,
1977 (R. 237, D-11); August 29, 1977 (R. 237, 0-21); August 31,
1977 (R. 237, o-22); and September 12, 1977 (R. 237, D-26). The
September 6, 1977 invoice (R. 237, D-24), was the last request for
additlonal compensations submitted by the Appellant that appears
~n the present record.
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aaterialaaD against a general contractor and the general contractor'• •urety, held that negotiation by defendants with plaintiff concerning settlement of a dispute did not constitute a

waiv~

by defendants of the one year statute of limitations. Similarly,
in carpenter International, Inc. v. Kaiser Jamaica Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 396 (D. Del. 1975) the Court rejected a waiver argument made
by a contractor based on a settlement meeting held to discuss the
contractor's claims. This Court should not prejudice the Respondet'.
for their attempts to amicably settle portions of the Appellant's
claim by discussing those claims at the August 22, 1977 meeting
nor by granting one of many different requests subsequent thereto
Finally, Appellant makes much of the idea that it was "lullec
into believing its claims would be granted in full after the
August 22. 1977 meeting.

Invoices submitted subsequent thereto,

however, completely belie that contention.

Specifically,

Appell~

contends that "had plaintiff been told that its claims were
untimely, plaintiff could either have ceased work, or have submitted claims on a daily basis after August 22."

After the

August 22 meeting, an invoice for work during the week of August.
1977 was submitted.

(R. 237, D-23).

On August 31, 1977 an

invoice was submitted for the week of August 22, 1977, detailing
the equipment and labor for August 22, 23, 24, and 25. (R. 237, :·
22).

On September 6, 1977 an invoice was submitted for the week

of August 29, 1977, detailing equipment and labor for August 29.
30, 31 and September 1 and 2.

(R. 237, D-24).

A rev1ew of the

record shows that Appellant acted no d1fferently after the Augus:
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22 meeting than it did before.

After, as before, the Appellant

continued to submit claims for interference which failed to
comply with the contract.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has raised no valid ground for granting ita Petition
for Rehearing.

The matters now raised are not properly before this

Court since Appellant failed to properly raise the issues in the
lower court.

Further, this Court fully considered all matters in

its previous Opinion which are now raised by the Appellant. Finally,
Appellant's argument is unsupported by the record and is contrary
to appropriate policy and the applicable law.
DATED this ~ day of May, 1980.

I .

L/\?1~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 1980, 1 delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF IN
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING to Peter W. Billings, Warren
Patten and Charles B. Casper, of and for Fabian & Clendenin,
Attorneys for Appellant, 800 continental Bank Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101.
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